World Trade Through History

World exports grew from roughly 2% of global GDP in 1820 to 14% in 1913 — the 'first wave of globalization'. It collapsed in the inter-war period, falling back to 5% by 1945. The second wave, accelerated by GATT and container shipping, drove exports past 30% of GDP in 2008, or about 61% counting exports plus imports. It has since plateaued, with the world entering a 'slowbalization' phase.

~2%
World exports / GDP in 1820
14%
Peak of first globalization (1913)
~30%
Modern peak around 2008
~28%
Current level (2024) — plateau

Key insights

🚢

First wave: steam, telegraph, gold standard

Between 1870 and 1913, exports as a share of world GDP rose by more than half. Steamships cut Atlantic crossing times from 40 days to 7. The transatlantic telegraph enabled price arbitrage. The gold standard reduced exchange-rate risk. Migration, capital flows and trade all peaked together — and all collapsed together in 1914.

📦

Second wave: GATT, containers, China's entry

Post-1945, the GATT/WTO trading rounds cut average industrial tariffs from 22% to under 5%. The shipping container (1956) cut handling costs ~95%. China's accession to the WTO in 2001 added 1.3 billion people to the world labour-supply at a stroke. By 2008 trade was over 30% of GDP — twice the 1913 peak in proportional terms.

🪨

Are we in a third wave or a retrenchment?

Trade-to-GDP has been roughly flat since 2008. The 2018+ US-China tariff escalation, supply-chain reshoring, and conflict-driven disruptions have all pressed in the same direction. Services trade, digital trade and intra-firm transfers continue to grow faster than goods trade — so the headline ratio understates the deeper integration that has continued.

World exports as % of global GDP 1820–2024

World exports / global GDP, current prices. Exports plus imports would be about double

Show data table
World exports as % of global GDP 1820–2024
Trade % of GDP
18202
18709
190012
191314
192916
19455
196011
198018
200025
200830
202025
202428

Key Finding: Two clear waves separated by the inter-war collapse; the current plateau is the third inflection.

Average tariffs — major economies (1850–2024)

Average tariff on imports of manufactures, %

Show data table
Average tariffs — major economies (1850–2024)
USAUK / EU
1850145
1875303
1900270
1913250
19253817
19324917
19501515
197078
199055
201022
202435

Key Finding: Tariffs were extremely high in the inter-war period; the post-WW2 fall is the underlying enabler of the second globalization wave. The 2024 point predates the sharp US tariff rises of 2025.

Methodology & caveats

Trade-to-GDP as a globalization metric

Trade-to-GDP is the most common headline measure but has known biases — it rises mechanically as supply chains lengthen (each component crossing borders is counted) and overstates 'real' integration. Value-added trade statistics (TiVA, WIOD) strip out double-counting and show globalization continuing past 2008.

First-globalization sources

Federico and Tena (2019) reconstructed world merchandise trade from 1800 onwards using national archives, port records and customs receipts. Pre-1870 figures are estimates; the picture from 1870 onwards is reasonably firm. Services trade is excluded from the historical series — modern figures include services.

What 'globalization' means here

This series captures merchandise integration, with services added only in modern years. Capital flows, migration and information flows are separate dimensions that broadly co-move but not perfectly. Each was strong in 1913, collapsed in 1914–45, and recovered to varying degrees post-1945. Current migration share of world population is below the 1913 peak.

Exports or total trade: why ratios differ

This page reports world exports relative to GDP, which is why its 2008 peak is near 30% while the Trade Openness page shows about 61% for the same year: that page adds exports and imports together. Neither is wrong, but mixing them makes modern globalisation look either twice as deep or half as deep as it was. Price basis matters as well. Measured at constant prices, the rise since 1950 looks steeper than at current prices, because traded manufactures became cheaper relative to services that stay at home. The historical series covers goods only, and the world GDP estimates for the 19th century are themselves reconstructions with a wide margin of error. Pre-1870 values should therefore be read as approximate levels rather than precise points, and the safest conclusion is the broad shape of the two waves.

Cite this page

GlobeChart. “World Trade Through History.” Last updated 2026-10-31. https://globechart.com/global-trade/historical-trade/

Please also credit the original publisher named under each chart: Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database, World Bank; WTO, Bairoch historical tariff data, World Bank WITS. Spotted an error? Tell us.