Protectionism Through History

Modern protectionism has cycled. The 1815-1846 Corn Laws era. The 1860-1879 free-trade decades. The late-19th-century tariff revival (Bismarck 1879, McKinley 1890). The catastrophic Smoot-Hawley era of the 1930s. The 1945-2008 post-war liberalization. The post-2018 retrenchment driven by US-China competition and supply-chain reshoring. Each cycle has been driven by a specific combination of political, economic and geopolitical factors.

60%
Average US tariff on dutiable imports after Smoot-Hawley (peak 1932)
1.4%
Average OECD MFN tariff (2008 trough)
~11%
US average tariff rate, July 2026 (Yale Budget Lab)
4
Major historical protectionism waves since 1800

Key insights

📜

The Corn Laws debate set the template

Britain's Corn Laws (1815-1846) restricted grain imports to protect domestic agriculture. The debate over their repeal — Cobden, Bright, Ricardo's comparative advantage on one side; landed interests on the other — established the template for modern trade-policy debates: free trade as efficiency-enhancing vs protection as preserving incumbent industries and political constituencies. The 1846 repeal launched the 'first globalization' wave.

💀

Smoot-Hawley is the worst-case scenario

The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act raised US average tariffs on dutiable imports, which peaked at about 59% in 1932 as falling prices increased the weight of specific duties. Retaliation by trading partners followed. World trade fell ~65% by value from 1929 to 1933, with much of that drop due to falling prices. The fall was partly Smoot-Hawley, mostly the Depression. The episode became the cautionary tale for post-WWII trade architects who built GATT to prevent recurrence. The economic damage was historically large; the political damage to the open-trade narrative was even larger.

⚡

Post-2018 was a different kind of return

The US-China tariff cycle that began in 2018 is qualitatively different from earlier protectionism. It's bilateral, technology-focused, and motivated by national security/geopolitical concerns rather than broad protection of domestic industry. Average US tariffs rose modestly at first, from 1.4% to about 3% by 2024, with large increases in targeted categories (semiconductors, EVs, solar panels, batteries). The break came in 2025, when broad tariffs lifted the average effective rate to about 16%. The Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs in February 2026, but replacements held it near 11% by July 2026, far below Smoot-Hawley-era rates on dutiable goods but the highest in generations.

US average tariff 1820–2026

Average tariff on dutiable imports, %

Show data table
US average tariff 1820–2026
Avg tariff %
182057
185027
188030
190049
192238
193060
194515
196012
19805
20005
20183
20243
202611

Key Finding: Tariffs were the dominant federal revenue source through 1913. Smoot-Hawley spike (1930-32) followed by GATT-driven decline. Sharp rise since 2025. The 2026 point is the rate on all imports, which is lower than the dutiable-imports basis used historically.

Global trade decline during 1930s

World trade value as % of 1929 level

Show data table
Global trade decline during 1930s
World trade (1929=100)
1929100
193082
193158
193240
193335
193755

Key Finding: World trade value fell ~65% from 1929 to 1933, a combination of falling prices, the Depression and Smoot-Hawley retaliation.

Methodology & caveats

Average vs effective tariff

Headline average tariffs can mean: simple average across tariff lines, trade-weighted average, or applied vs bound rates. Trade-weighted averages naturally fall as prohibitive tariffs cut trade volumes — circular argument for declining protection. Effective protection rates (which account for tariff escalation through stages of production) are higher than nominal rates.

Why Smoot-Hawley wasn't 'the cause' of the Depression

Modern economic historians (Eichengreen, Bernanke) view Smoot-Hawley as a contributor to but not primary driver of the Depression. The Gold Standard mechanism, banking crises, and US monetary policy errors did more damage. But Smoot-Hawley's role in the trade collapse was significant — and political contagion ('beggar-thy-neighbor') was real.

Non-tariff protectionism

Modern protectionism uses many tools beyond tariffs: anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, quotas, technical standards, subsidies, public procurement preferences, investment screening, export controls. The post-2018 US-China competition has used many of these in addition to tariffs. Tracking non-tariff measures is much harder than tracking tariffs; the WTO and OECD have data but coverage is incomplete.

Why tariff series jump when measured differently

Two measures of the US tariff appear in history books. Duties as a share of dutiable imports is the high figure often quoted for Smoot-Hawley. Duties as a share of all imports is lower, because many goods entered free. The modern 2-3% and today's roughly 11% are on the all-imports basis, so setting them directly beside the 1930s dutiable figure understates how close some recent episodes came in historic terms: on an all-imports basis, the early-1930s peak was around 20%. Deflation also raised effective protection in the 1930s without any new law, because many duties were fixed in cents per unit. Both patterns warn against reading a tariff chart as a pure record of policy. Rates respond to import mix, prices and exemptions as well as to legislation.

Cite this page

GlobeChart. “Protectionism Through History.” Last updated 2026-10-31. https://globechart.com/global-trade/protectionism-history/

Please also credit the original publisher named under each chart: US Historical Statistics, USITC, US Census; League of Nations historical trade statistics, Kindleberger 1973. Spotted an error? Tell us.